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of the system 
In this paper, I intend to emphasize aspects of 
the present system of international economic 
relations in the monetary and financial area that 
create difficulties for an adequate insertion of 
Latin America in the world economy. I do not 
propose to make a comprehensive study of all 
transfers of resources between developed and 
developing countries. 
My comments will be arranged under 
three main headings: the workings of the 
present international monetary system; the 
effect of the present system on Latin American 
countries and less developed countries in 
general, and changes in the system that could 
help to minimize the present difficulties. 
Generalized floating of currencies became 
unavoidable as the Bretton Woods system 
proved incapable of providing enough adjust-
ment incentives for reserve currency countries, 
essentially the United States and the countries 
with surpluses. In fact, IMF "discipline" could 
only apply to non-reserve-currency deficit 
countries. Reserve currency deficit countries 
could finance their deficits with their own 
*Co-ordinator of the UNDP/CEPAL Joint Project 
"Implications for Latin America of the state of the interna-
tional monetary and financial system" (RLA/77/021). 
This paper is a revised version of the statement deliv-
ered by the author before the Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues on 5 May 1979 at 
Annecy, France. 
currency, while countries with surpluses did 
not need to request IMF assistance. 
The lack of international incentives to 
adjust created a situation where convertibility 
in terms of gold could not be maintained, and 
the Bretton Woods system collapsed. As a 
matter of fact, the lack of adjustment incentives, 
together with some domestic banking regula-
tions, gave rise to an explosive growth of 
private financial markets as financial inter-
mediation between surplus and deficit coun-
tries became more and more in demand. Be-
tween 1973 and 1978 the net size of the Euro-
currencies market grew at a rate of about 19% 
per year. 
Those changes are not only important 
quality-wise, however: they also represent a 
complete qualitative transformation of the 
system. 
1. The role of the monetary authorities 
and of the private sector 
The first important qualitative change is that 
wich took place in the market intervention role 
and reserve holdings of the monetary authori-
ties versus those of the private sector. In a fixed 
exchange rate system, the authorities have to 
maintain exchange rates through intervention 
in the market, for which purpose they must 
hold foreign exchange, gold and SDR reserves. 
In a floating system, such a role is transferred 
totally or partially to the private sector, and it is 
the latter which has an incentive to accumulate 
"reserves" in order to "intervene" in foreign 
exchange markets. 
This fact implies a higher sensitivity, or 
elasticity, of the composition of reserves to 
economic incentives. Usually, central banks 
are less sensitive to changes in expectations 
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than private holders of foreign exchange. The 
latter tend to adjust the composition of their 
holdings rapidly when relative interest rates or 
exchange rates are expected to vary. Hence, the 
more important the role of private holders in 
foreign exchange markets, the faster will be the 
reaction to changes in expectations. The expec-
tation of devaluation of a reserve currency —or 
a currency important in international trade— 
brings about an immediate change in the 
composition of assets and liabilities of the 
private sector and this helps to produce the 
expected devaluation. In a sense, it could be 
said that under the present system, since 
central banks cannot resist the pressure of 
private speculators, generalized expectations 
will never be wrong. 
Another consequence of the increased 
importance of the private sector in intervention 
is a relative reduction in the demand for SDRs. 
In fact, SDRs cannot be held by the private 
sector, but insofar as the relative importance of 
private "reserve" currency holdings increases, 
the demand for SDRs will decrease relative to 
that for currrencies. All this has important 
implications for the system as a whole (the 
implications for LDGs will be developed later). 
(a) Exchange rate changes tend to "over-
shoot the mark", so that the magnitudes of such 
changes tend to be relatively large. It has been 
observed that prices tend to react faster than 
quantities to exchange rate changes in indus-
trial countries. Thus, when a particular cur-
rency suffers a devalution, the export prices of 
the devaluing country tend to fall and import 
prices to rise soon after devaluation, but export 
and import volumes react more slowly, so that, 
for a time, a devaluation increases the imbal-
ance it was suppossed to correct. Private hold-
ers of the currency will see their devaluation 
expectations reinforced, and the exchange rate 
will reflect such strengthened expectations 
with further devaluation. Then, after some 
time, the effect of devaluation will show itself 
in the balance of payments, in the form of a 
relative reduction of imports as compared to 
exports, and the opposite process will be 
generated. As this process is better understood 
and the pattern of events repeats itself, the 
private sector may "learn" to speculate better 
and the destabilizing effect of expectations 
formed in the way described above should tend 
to dissappear. The length of the learning period 
is, however, unknown. 
(b) The degree of stringency of monetary 
policy becomes more difficult to evaluate. Let 
us take, for example, a German-based company 
that holds US dollars in its assets. If such a 
company expects a reduction in the value of the 
dollar relative to the German mark, it will try to 
sell its dollars for marks, while if the Bundes-
bank wants to give at least partial support to the 
dollar to avoid an excessive strengthening of 
the mark, it will buy the dollars in exchange for 
marks. The figures in Germany will show an 
increase in the money supply, whereas all that 
has happened is a change in the composition of 
assets of the German-based company. There is 
no reason for this action to change the desired 
spending pattern of the company, so that the 
increase in the money supply in Germany will 
have no direct inflationary effect. Of course, the 
real world is not this simple, but I hope that 
this example serves to illustrate the essence of 
my argument. 
(c) Exchange rates become more volatile 
through changes in transactions on capital 
account (capital flows). If private capital and 
money markets are well developed, with 
reserves diversified in terms of currencies, 
changes in expectations will affect the market 
rapidly and fully: desired changes in the 
composition of assets and liabilities of eco-
nomic agents will be reflected in market 
actions which will result in changes in ex-
change rates. The money markets for devel-
oped countries' currencies are sufficiently 
deep to allow the operation of a futures market 
where interested parties can buy "coverage" 
for exchange risks. With or without coverage, 
however, changes in domestic interest rates or 
other factors affecting the desired composition 
of assets and liabilities will tend to produce 
sizable capital movements, unless interest rate 
policy is closely associated with expected 
exchange rates. Such association is very diffi-
cult to achieve in practice, so exchange rates 
must be expected to vary sharply in short 
periods of time. 
Furthermore, changes produced through 
the capital account may tend to reinforce those 
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in the current account. An unfavourable 
current account will produce devaluation 
expectations. At the same time, the expected 
cost of borrowing abroad or the expected 
benefit of external investment will increase 
(due to the expected devaluation), producing as 
a consequence an imbalance in the capital 
account with the same sign as that in the 
current account. Since, as pointed out above, 
the adjustments in the current account come 
about only slowly, one must expect relatively 
sharp movements in exchange rates on this 
account, on at least a movement in a particular 
direction for some time and then a reversal, in 
a cycle which will take two or three years to 
develop fully. 
(d) Sharp changes in exchange rates help 
to stimulate protectionist tendencies in world 
trade. As some currencies appreciate, the 
issuing countries will face some loss of com-
petit iveness, while deficit countries, whose 
currencies depreciate, tend to yield more 
easily to protectionist lobbyists on balance-of-
payments grounds. Thus, global resistance to 
protectionism is substantially weakened, and if 
at the same time, for this and other reasons, the 
world economy is expanding slowly, the stage 
is set for the proliferation of direct controls, 
regulations and increased tariffs on trade. 
2. The international transmission of 
economic disturbances 
With fixed exchange rates, it was expected that 
inflation rates in the world would tend towards 
equality, since it was argued that any dis-
crepancy would bring about imbalances in 
foreign payments that would force adjustment. 
As exchange rates were not completely fixed, 
however, some discrepancy in inflation rates 
was allowed for, over and above that coming 
from different rates of change in productivity. 
Between 1960 and 1970 the average yearly rate 
of inflation for 9 industrial countries' was 3.5%, 
with a standard deviation of 1.5 and a coef-
ficient of variability of 0.43. Floating, it was 
argued, would allow for more freedom in 
domest ic monetary policy, since variation in 
1 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Nether lands, Uni ted Kingdom and United States. 
exchange rates would insulate countries from 
external shocks. On these grounds, rates of 
inflation should have diverged after 1973 more 
than they did before, and particularly before 
1970. 
However, empirical evidence does not lend 
support to this expectation. For the same 9 
countries considered, yearly inflation between 
1974 and 1977 averaged 11.3%, with a standard 
deviation of 4.8 and a coefficient of variability 
of 0.42; i.e., practically indentical to that 
prevailing in the 1960s, while for the period 
1970-1973 —a transitional period— the average 
rate of inflation was 6.5%, with a standard 
deviation of 1.7 and a coefficient of variability 
of 0.26. I t therefore looks as though floating 
rates have not helped very much to insulate 
countries from external disturbances. An 
alternative hypothesis, which I have put 
forward elsewhere, could be formulated to 
explain this behaviour. For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to point out that floating has not 
insulated countries from external shocks. 
Floating is no substitute for responsible do-
mestic policies. 
3. Creation of international liquidity 
The present system has considerably obscured 
the concept of international liquidity itself. 
When the authorities accumulated most of their 
external reserves the concept was clear-cut. 
But as soon as the private sector assumed, 
partly or wholly, the responsibility for inter-
vening in the market, the concept of interna-
tional liquidity became vague and ill-defined. 
Should it be only official reserves which were 
considered? Or should one take account of 
private holdings in some way? These questions 
are not academic, for the difference between 
official holdings and "total" holdings of foreign 
exchange —and gold and SDRs— is enormous 
(the second is at least twice the first). 
In a floating system, it is legitime to 
consider private holdings of foreign exchange 
as "international liquidity", since there should 
be a demand in the private sector for such 
holdings, and if the demand is not satisfied, the 
private sector will look for ways to satisfy it, 
even creating new liquidity instruments. In a 
world where the foreign exchange operations 
of banks in industrial countries and offshore 
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centres are usually not subjected to the same 
types of controls as their domestic currency 
operations, the supply of international liquidi-
ty becomes demand-determined. And insofar 
as the foreign exchange holdings of the private 
sector are a good substitute for domestic (or 
national) money, changes in the supply of the 
first will affect the demand for the second. 
Through this process, national central banks 
lose control over the relevant monetary aggre-
gates. This is not because they cannot control 
the supply of domestic money in the short run, 
but because the demand for such money chan-
ges, with the result that control or regulation 
not only of the rate of growth of international 
liquidity, but also of liquidity in general, 
becomes much less effective. Of course, if the 
supply of liquidity in the form of foreign 
exchange becomes essentially demand-deter-
mined, the relative importance of SDRs is 
bound to suffer. 
II 
The effects on Latin American and other 
developing countries 
As the system, or lack of it, works at present, 
one must expect relatively sharp and recurrent 
variations in the exchange rates of the principal 
currencies. Most Latin American countries, as 
well as other less developed countries (LDCs), 
peg their own currencies to one or another of 
the principal currencies, or to a basket of them. 
Pegging is necessary because most LDCs do 
not have financial or money markets deep 
enough to do otherwise, the Central Bank 
being the only entity capable of absorbing 
short-run excess supply or demand for the 
domestic currency. But pegging means that the 
domestic currency moves together with the 
currency or currencies to which it is pegged, 
and the fluctuations of those currencies are 
geared to the adjustment needs of the issuing 
countries, not of the pegging country. Hence, 
floating imposes a cost on LDCs in terms of 
destabilizing influences on their economies. 
Floating also tends to discourage the allocation 
of additional resources to the production of 
tradeable goods, since an uncertainty element 
is introduced in all calculations regarding 
activities connected with foreign trade. In most 
cases, the LDCs exporters cannot even buy 
coverage, because there is no futures market for 
their own currencies. 
There are more deep-seated problems 
than this, however. Thus, if floating does not 
insulate countries from external shocks, it does 
not solve the adjustment problem in the short 
or medium run either, and may even compli-
cate it. As everyone knows, if there is a group of 
countries running a protracted surplus on 
current account, there must be another group 
running a deficit, and floating will not correct 
the situation. Floating could perhaps equi-
librate the balance of payments as a whole, in 
the long run, but it might never produce 
equilibrium in the balance-of-payments cur-
rent account. As we have already seen, the 
short-run effect of floating on the current 
account of the balance of payments and on the 
balance of payments as a whole may actually be 
destabilizing. 
As a matter of fact, equilibrium on the 
current account is not an ideal situation. Non-
oil-exporting developing countries are net ca-
pital importers, so that the desired position of 
their current account is one of deficit, to be 
financed with a surplus on the capital account. 
In the case of Latin America, the average deficit 
on the current account of the non-oil-exporting 
countries for the period 1974-1978 is five times 
larger than for the period 1966-1970. The 
capital surplus should be high enough to cover 
the deficit on the current account and the 
necessary increase in reserve holdings. But a 
surplus on the capital account is only a more 
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respectable way to refer to a net increase in 
foreign debt, since unrequited transfers are 
negligible and direct foreign investment is not 
on the increase and is concentrated in a few 
countries. At all events, new net indebtedness 
accounts for at least 80% of the surplus on the 
capital account of the non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries. 
Table 1 
EXTERNAL FINANCING OF LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
(Billions of dollars) 
Deficit on current account4 
Increase in reserves" 
Use of external financing (uses) 




Loans from official sources 
Multilateral 
Bilateral 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; Bank for International Settlements: supple-
ments for July and December 1978 and Yearbook; CEPAL estimates. 
aExcluding official donations. 
Positive figure indicates an increase in reserves. 
^Includes long, medium and short-term non-compensatory and compensatory loans. 
dAll figures for 1978 are provisional. 
Table 2 
ESTIMATED OVERALL INDEBTEDNESS 
OF LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
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Despite the levels already reached by such 
debt (over 100 billion dollars for the non-oil-
exporting countries of Latin America by the 
end of 1978) it must go on increasing for many 
years if the development process is to continue 
and if world resources are to be more efficiently 
allocated. The additional short-run instability 
in the balance of payments which is a by-
product of floating, however, does not facilitate 
official decisions in industrial countries about 
long-term development finance, while private 
financial markets expand rapidly. Thus, the 
terms of the new financing are substantially 
worse than those of the past, both in terms of 
interest rates and of amortizations schedules. 
" D e b t burden" becomes a problem for further 
borrowing, a problem which is more a con-
sequence of the present system than of "mis-
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behaviour", even though the latter is not 
always absent. Moreover, as debt terms dete-
riorate, borrowing countries need to increase 
their reserve holdings, both in order to present 
a better " image" and in order to be ready to 
offset possible outflows. So, as the terms dete-
riorate, the necessary rate of accumulation of 
reserves tends to grow, and so does the neces-
sary net borrowing per year. 
An obvious way out of this problem for 
LDCs would be to expand exports. If exports 
grew at a rapid rate, both the "debt burden" 
and the current account deficit could be re-
duced. However, as pointed out above, in the 
present circumstances the developed countries 
tend to yield more easily to protecionist pres-
At least some of the roots of the difficulties 
pointed out above can be traced to problems of 
the adjustment process and of liquidity crea-
tion. If the adjustment process worked smooth-
ly, and international liquidity grew at a rea-
sonably stable rate, excessive fluctuating of 
exchange rates would be flattened out and 
there woud be less of a weakening of the will to 
resist protectionist measures. 
One could argue that the adjustment 
process is working smoothly when the choice 
be tween fixed or floating exchange rates be-
comes irrelevant. In other words, if the domes-
tic policies of the main industrial countries 
were strictly co-ordinated, there would be no 
need to vary their exchange rates vis-à-vis each 
other in the short run, and there would there-
fore be no need for floating. I hope it is obvious 
by now how great an interest LDCs have in 
more stable exchange rates and a smoother 
adjustment process. 
But of course close co-ordination of domes-
tic policies is an ideal which is very difficult to 
reach. Different countries have different insti-
tutions, different interest groups and different 
sures, so that this way out does not seem to be 
feasible. In fact, a recent article in IMF Survey 
reaches the conclusions that protectionism has 
increased significantly in the recent past, and 
the trend does not show signs of abating.2 
Regrettably, this trend has emerged precisely 
when a good number of LDCs, at least in Latin 
America, are following an outward-oriented 
strategy. 
This strategy, to be succesful, requires two 
prerequisites: foreign markets and foreign fi-
nance. The former are being increasedly pro-
tected from outside competition. The latter is 
available, but on terms thatare compatible only 
with a rapid growth of LDC exports. 
social and political forces. For example, some 
countries can export their unemployed and so 
can accept more restrictive economic policies 
than others. 
However difficult it is, I believe one 
should continue trying to secure closer co-
ordination of economic policies among indus-
trial countries. Naturally, such co-ordination 
should take global needs into account, so as to 
facilitate the necessary current account deficit 
of the LDCs ant its adequate financing. In this 
way, a smoother process of real resource trans-
fers would be achieved. In order to ensure the 
consideration of global needs, LDCs should be 
represented in some way in discussions on 
policy co-ordination among industrial coun-
tries. 
Reports that take a global look at the world 
economy play an important role here. For 
example, the excellent IMF periodic reports on 
the world economic outlook should be given 
wider circulation. The Interim Committee of 
2"Retreat from liberal trade becomes clearer as more 
restrictive practices take effect", IMF Survey, April 9,1979. 
I l l 
What can be done to solve, or at least alleviate, 
the present difficulties in the monetary 
and financial system? 
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the Board of Governors of the Fund should 
perhaps devote at least one full meeting a year 
to evaluating and discussing the world econo-
mic situation. But policy co-ordination touches 
some very sensitive points in many countries, 
and for this reason it requires some degree of 
regular involvement of governments at the 
highest political level. 
At the same time, however, improving the 
adjustment process is in the interests of all 
countries, developing and developed alike. 
All the effort expended in attaining the 
goal of policy co-ordination is well spent. 
However , one cannot expect such efforts to be 
fully effective alone, so some action should be 
taken in especially difficult areas even before 
co-ordination is improved: 
(a) Asset settlement of international obliga-
tions should be established, in order to create 
an incentive for reserve currency countries to 
adjust. 
If asset settlement were the norm, coun-
tries could not settle their international obliga-
tions by simply increasing their liabilities 
abroad. Hence, if a reserve currency country 
were in deficit, it would pay for it with assets, 
like any other country. The adjustment incen-
tive would appear as those assets were de-
pleted. 
(b) An account aimed at the substitution of 
SDRs for reserve currencies should be setup in 
the IMF. Its role would be to minimize 
pressure on exchange rates due to desired 
changes in foreign exchange portfolios of mo-
netary authorities. The countries issuing the 
currency accumulated in the account would 
recover it in an agreed period, in exchange for 
SDRs. In fact, this would be a form of short-
term debt consolidation for some industrial 
countries. As these countries recover their 
currencies from the account, the SDRs accu-
mulated there could be used for long-term 
lending to LDCs. One might call this operation 
the "substitution link". 
(c) Countries with net reserves higher 
than, say, 4 months ' imports and with reserves 
growing faster than a given rate per year would 
pay a tax on their reserves. One way to apply 
this concept, for example, would be not to 
allocate SDRs to such countries in a future 
allocation, the SDRs not allocated to them 
being assigned to LDCs in proportion to their 
quotas in the IMF. In this way, an incentive for 
surplus countries to adjust would be establish-
ed. One might call this the "adjustment link". 
(d) A debt refinancing facility should be 
established, perhaps as a joint undertaking of 
the World Bank and the IMF. This facility 
would operate under a system similar to that of 
the Oil Facility of the IMF. LDCs would have 
voluntary access to it on the basis of a pre-
established set of indicators, but the amount 
and conditions of refinancing would be studied 
case by case. A refinancing facility would be a 
natural L D C counterpart to a substitution 
account for reserve currency countries. 
(e) A forum should be established where 
monetary, trade and development matters, 
which are so closely linked, are regularly 
jointly discussed, with main tendencies being 
highlighted and policy measures suggested. 
Such a forum could assess the global contribu-
tion of each industrial country to development, 
taking into account their contribution both 
through trade and through aid and other finan-
cial flows. The ideal could be to create some 
form of international economic court that could 
pass judgement, particularly on restrictive 
trade practices, and establish compensation for 
the economic damage caused. Countries could 
then evaluate whether or not it was in their 
own interests to apply protectionist measures 
and to pay compensation for them. This con-
cept of "compensated protectionism" could be 
further evolved as a way to allow countries 
some freedom in this respect, but with compen-
satory payments to countries damaged in the 
process. The multipolarity of the present world 
lends some realism to this proposal. 
Of course, most of these ideas are neither 
new or realistic. However, the problem of 
development will be with us for a sufficiently 
long time to permit some unrealistic ap-
proaches at present. I believe that, as time 
passes, it will be increasingly clear that devel-
opment is not a problem of developing coun-
tries alone, but of the world as a whole. This is 
my justification for considering not only prob-
lems of the Latin American countries, or of all 
developing countries, but also problems of the 
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The Latin American countries and the New 
International Economic Order 
Pedro Malan* 
Introduction 
As is well known by now, the so-called North-
South agenda is made up of a whole array of 
political and economic issues: the presently 
changing patterns' of trade, old and new trade 
restrictions, the implications of foreign invest-
ment , the volume and burden of foreign debt, 
the yet to be designed future international 
monetary system, the controversial commodity 
price stabilization schemes, the frightening 
poverty of the Fourth World, and so on. It is 
obvious that these issues will remain on the 
agenda —political and economic— for many 
years to come. This is not the time to present 
yet another survey of the present state of 
frustration with respect to the progress achiev-
ed so far in several of the topics listed above. 
The question to which we would like to 
address ourselves in this paper is the following 
one: does Latin America as a region have a 
common stake in these ongoing discussions?1 
If so, in which ones? If the region is not a 
meaningful economic region and interests 
diverge sharply between different countries 
—or groups of countries— then do they have 
an identity of interest with other countries 
(developing or developed) outside the region? 
In other words, is there anything specific to 
Latin America as a region, or to Latin American 
countries qua Latin American countries, in 
terms of either the international resource-
transfer mechanisms or the international dis-
tribution of political power, both presently 
under sharp criticism in all international 
forums? 
In order to discuss these questions, this 
paper is organized as follows: section I at-
tempts to place the issue of the relationship of 
Latin America with the New International 
Economic Order in what we feel is a much-
needed wider global context. This is done by 
presenting in a rather summary fashion the 
major dominant viewpoints of both North and 
South concerning the so-called North-South 
conflict.2 Section II deals with Latin America 
proper. Its purpose is to sort out what are the 
specifically Latin American interests —if 
any— in the ongoing discussions, concen-
trating on three major areas of interest (and 
conflict): (a) the changing patterns of trade and 
protection; (b) the implications of foreign 
direct investment, and (c) capital flows, ex-
ternal debt and the future international mone-
tary system. 
T h e political process of identification of what 
Professor Hirschman considered to be the 
most pressing problems3 to be tackled by 
public policy is both a global one (taking place 
at international forums such as the United 
*Department of Economics, Catholic University of Rio 
de Janeiro. 
*For a positive answer see Francisco Orrego Vicuña, 
"Las alternativas de América Latina como clase media de 
las naciones", Estudios Internacionales, Buenos Aires, 
Vol X, No. 40, October/December 1977, pp. 89-110. 
Nations, UNCTAD, CIEC meetings and all 
conferences where so-called North-South 
2This section draws heavily on a previous work of the 
author. See P. Malan, Brazilian International Economic 
Relations: An Agenda for Research, mimeo, 1977. Written 
originally in English, this paper was published in Portu-
guese in Dados, No. 17, 1978 and in Spanish in Estudios 
Internacionales, Vol. XI, No. 41, January-March 1978, 
pp. 62-70. 
3A. O. Hirschman, "Policymaking and Policy Analysis 
in Latin America - A Return Journey", Policy Sciences, 
Amsterdam, No. 6, 1975, especially pp. 388-394. 
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conflict issues are under discussion) and a 
domest ic one (in which the agenda of relevant 
problems and alternative solutions to them 
is a natural object of controversy, mediated 
by and reflected within the State). In this 
section, we attempt to discuss the relevant 
issues involved in the framing of an eventual 
New International Economic Order from two 
points of view. The first is the viewpoint of 
the central countries, i.e., the meaning to them 
of the re-organization of the world economy 
and their dominant views, likely answers, and 
major options on the so-called North-South 
conflict. The second viewpoint is the effect of 
the political and economic decisions (or lack of 
decisions) of the advanced countries on the 
peripheral (Southern) countries, and the lat-
ter's response to them. The following para-
graphs deal with the viewpoints of the North-
ern economies. They are not very reassuring, 
d u e to the present fragmentation of power. 
But this, as we are going to argue later, is a 
mixed blessing. 
T h e Northern economies have success-
fully followed a policy of benign neglect with 
regard to the developing countries' criticisms 
of the old international economic order as 
working to their disadvantage. The early writ-
ings of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, the Bandung Conference in 1955, 
even the creation of UNCTAD in 1964 (and 
its role since then) were seen as a display of 
ineffective political mumblings completed 
with a dash of bad economics and wrapped in 
sheer rhetorical jargon. The collapse of the 
Bretton Woods arrangement in 1971-1972, 
followed soon after by the successful assertion 
of market power by the OPEC in 1973-1974, 
and the adoption, exactly five years ago, of a 
"Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States" by the United Nations General As-
sembly (with its call for a "New International 
Economic Order") dramatically changed the 
picture and prompted the advanced countries 
to agree to start serious talks. 
The outcome of these talks is as yet un-
predictable. The failure of the eighteen-month 
C I E C meeting in Paris in 1976 was not a final 
result, and the whole panoply of economic 
issues that make up the North-South agenda 
again came under discussion at UNCTAD V 
in May 1979. Much depends on the Northern 
countries ' response to the as yet somewhat 
unarticulated specific demands of the LDCs. 
T h e issues and criticisms raised so far, how-
ever, will not vanish into thin air —they are 
likely to remain on the agenda, both economic 
and political, for the whole of the 1980s. Few 
would disagree that we are living now through 
a period of economic and institutional crisis 
such as the world had not experienced since 
the 1930s— nearly half a century ago. 
What has been shocking to the Northern 
economies' representatives in international 
discussions —surprising as it may seem— is 
what they consider an undersirable and exces-
sive politicization of the issues at stake.4 
Scholars with some sense of history, however, 
distinguish between two levels of analysis: 
"a process level dealing with short-term be-
haviour within a constant set of institutions, 
fundamental assumptions and expectations; 
and a structure level, having to do with long-
term political and economic determinants of 
the systematic incentives and constraints 
within which actors operate ... It is when 
accepted structures with their associated rules 
of the game are called into question that con-
troversy, and therefore politicization, are likely 
to increase most rapidly ... questions of who 
will exercise political control and how, become 
dominant".5 Indeed, frustrating though it may 
seem so far, the debate on the New Interna-
tional Economic Order has sharply focussed 
the attention of the world on the need to re-
examine the implicit politics and existing (and 
missing) rules of the game. It is not something 
that one could expect to see solved in a few 
years, especially when there is no agreement 
on an agenda for action even within the sup-
posedly threatened Northern countries. 
4 See , for example, N. Left", "The New Economic 
Order - Bad Economics, Worse Politics", Foreign Policy, 
Farmingdale, N.Y., Fall issue, November 24, 1976. For a 
more balanced account, see the first published volume of 
the Council on Foreign Relations' 1980's Project; F. 
Hirsch, M. Doyle and E. L. Morse, "Alternatives to 
Monetary Disorder", Mc Graw-Hill, 1977. 
5 C F. Bergsten, R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, "Inter-
national Economics and International Politics: a Frame-
work for Analysis" in C. F. Bergsten and L. B. Krause 
(eds.), World Politics and international Economics, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 1975, pp, 5-6. 
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Indeed, the response of the Northern 
countries to Southern pressures will probably 
develop according to the (non-mutually-ex-
clusive) patterns of: (a) resistance (whenever 
the challenge from the LDCs can easily be 
turned back); (b) co-optation of some of the 
bigger and higher-income LDCs6 and (c) com-
promise (whenever some concessions must 
be made to preserve the Northern economies' 
control of the basic decisions). However, much 
more important than to guess prospective 
response from the North is to assess the domi-
nant attitudes prevailing in these societies, 
especially in the United States, which, despite 
its declining importance (as compared with 
the immediate post-war period), is still the 
key country influencing the future outcome of 
the North-South conflict. 
There seem to be four dominant attitudes 
in the North on issues related to this conflict. 
The first one is what Roger Hansen called the 
"Southern Unity Won't Last" attitude.7 It was 
clearly the policy outcome which the major 
industrial countries (especially the United 
States) were hoping to bring about, and is still 
very influential. Its first major setback was the 
inability to set non-oil developing countries 
against the oil exporters shortly after OPEC's 
first dramatic price rise, while the second was 
the refusal by OPEC and all the other LDCs 
to restrict the Paris Conference to a discussion 
of energy problems alone. This attitude is still 
very much alive, however, and cannot be ruled 
out. What do Brazil, Upper Volta, Sri Lanka 
and Iraq have in common? Perhaps only a 
shared sense of deprivation vis-à-vis the 
OECD countries. But as R. Hansen rightly 
reminded us, this "unnatural alliance" should 
not be underestimated "especially when faced 
6Witness the expansion of the "Group of Ten" to the 
"Group of Twenty" in the IMF, the suggestion that Brazil 
and Iran be invited to join the OECD, and so forth (this 
suggestion was put forward by C. F. Bergsten in J. 
Bhagwati (éd.), "The New International Economic Order", 
MIT Press, 1977. 
7 See R. Hansen, "Major U.S. Options on North-South 
Relations: A Letter to President Carter" in The United 
States and World Development - Agenda 1977 by J. Sewell 
and the staff of the Overseas Development Council, 
Praeger, 1977, p . 25. The next few paragraphs draw heavily 
on this rather interesting "action" memorandum. 
by intransigent Northern solidarity ... and if no 
other card is played at the bargaining table".8 
The events of the last five years do suggest that 
Northern responses will have to move progres-
sively away from resistance and towards co-
optation and compromise formulae. 
The search for compromise formulae 
within the framework of multilateral diploma-
cy in an international community in which 
power is more diffuse than ever before is the 
basis for the second major Northern attitude 
on the North-South conflict: the multilateral 
approach searching for collective consent. As 
Professor Dahrendorf has put it: "The number 
of actors is large, the degree of their cohesion 
is small, the definition of the situation is im-
precise. ... While a cynical view of international 
organizations and conferences is spreading ... 
this method of dealing with international 
conflict is in fact becoming more and more 
important... there will be more conferences".9 
Not because one can be sure that some 150 
nations would ever reach agreed solutions to 
global issues, but simply because there is no 
alternative. Constructive leadership, however, 
is unfortunately in short supply, except per-
haps in one very controversial area. 
This area is that of the third Northern {as a 
matter of fact essentially United States) attitude 
on the North-South issue: the equity perspec-
tive. As is well known, it is very much linked 
to the present United States strategy of attempt-
ing to reassert leadership in world economic 
affairs, after Vietnam and Watergate, by in-
fusing American foreign policy with a greater 
sense of justice and moral purpose. The equity 
perspective, however, covers many different 
and often contradictory concerns. In Northern 
parlance the concern is with equity considera-
tions within developing countries themselves 
or, as a variant, with human rights issues. In 
"Southern" parlance the equity issue is related 
to what is perceived as an unfair inter-country 
pattern of income distribution resulting from 
the present international "order". The North-
8R. Hansen, op. cit., p . 29. 
9Rolf Dahrendorf, "International Power; A European 
Perspective", Foreign Affairs, New York, August 1977, 
p. 81 . 
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ern liberal's response to LDC claims for a New 
International Economic Order which empha-
sizes the equity issue is to point out that these 
claims, if ever accepted, may have little, if 
any, effect on the distribution of income, 
wealth or opportunities within LDCs —and 
that this should be their major concern.10 Since 
most developing countries' ruling groups con-
sider this issue a non-negotiable one and a 
purely internal affair, a stalemate is likely to 
occur, unless the Northern concern comes to 
be seen as an irreversible trend (which it has 
not yet) and a mutually satisfactory definition 
of "acceptable" inequality and "minimum" 
human rights is reached in the North-South 
discussions. In the attempt to avoid this hard 
nut to crack, a fourth Northern perspective has 
recently been put forward. 
This fourth perspective is concerned not 
with income differentials and their evolution, 
but with absolute poverty; it is the basic human 
needs perspective concerned with a terrible 
fate of around one billion people —close to 
25% of the world's population— who live in 
miserable deprivation. In principle, everyone 
is against sheer misery. However, the concern 
raises the same sort of problems as the previous 
perspective: the so-called "domestic élite" 
problem. As Hansen has noted: "No program 
to eliminate absolute poverty can be con-
structed and implemented without the neces-
sary degree of commitment of a country's 
governing élite groups and political system. 
No amount of foreign resources can overcome 
domestic resistance or indifference to the 
achievement of this goal".11 
In short, summing up this rather brief 
sketch of dominant Northern perspectives, 
two of them (the "Southern Unity Won't Last" 
and the "Global Multilateral Approach") may 
lead to Northern policy options which are 
essentially a continuation of the present poli-
cies with ad hoc marginal changes to ac-
comodate demands which cannot be —-as in the 
l u For an elaboration of this influential (at least within 
the United States) argument by an economist now at the 
forefront of American foreign economic policy, see R. 
Cooper, "A New International Economic Order for Mutual 
Gain", Foreign Policy, No. 26, Spring 1977. 
U R . Hansen, op. cit., p . 34. 
past— effectively resisted. The other two at-
titudes ("Equity" and "Basic Needs") attempt 
to partially shift the blame for the present 
unsatisfactory (in view of the LDCs) workings 
of the international economic order essentially 
on to the developing countries' own internal 
policies or political systems. The setting may 
well evolve into a sort of "dialogue of the deaf" 
if some basic agreement about the agenda and 
about some long-run perspectives both in the 
North and in the South is not reached in time. 
The next few paragraphs deal with the likely 
effect of these Northern perspectives —and 
Northern structural trends— on the peripheral 
economies, with special reference to Latin 
America. In our view, any discussion about 
international economic relations must start 
with a grasp of world structural changes and 
of present Northern attitudes. After all, even 
if initiatives come from the South it is the 
Northern response to them which will shape 
the future arrangements. 
The so-called "Southern" attitudes on the 
issues involved in the framing of the New 
International Economic Order are dominated 
by the desire to obtain control of additional 
real resources so as to speed the development 
process in the LDCs. Such real resource trans-
fers may involve "current account financing" 
(through price changes, through aid or 
through default on external debt) or "capital 
account financing" (through borrowing or 
through running down reserves). All LDCs, 
whether commercial or aid-dependent,12 
would rather have current account financing 
of the required real resource transfers, espe-
cially through price changes,13 since this does 
1 Commercial" developing countries are those which 
have regular access to commercial bank lending. Most of 
the non-OPEC LDCs, as is well known, depend mainly 
on foreign aid, being unable to attract much bank lending. 
Nine "commercial" countries (Brazil, Mexico, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Argentina, Peru, Colombia 
and Israel) accounted for more than 80% of LDC bank 
deb t outstanding by the end of 1976. See David O. Beim, 
"Rescuing the LDCs", Foreign Affairs, July 1977, 
pp. 718-719. 
1 Not only in the prices of LDC commodity exports. 
Continuing world inflation reduces the real burden of the 
debt, but obviously this is not an adequate solution to the 
problem, since the expectation of inflation will raise 
interest rates and hence the cost of servicing the debt. 
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not —as capital account financing does— 
involve reverse transfers in the future. In this 
discussion, commercial and aid-dependent 
countries are likely to form a common front, 
rightly insisting upon the fact that the advanced 
countries cannot continue to be internationalist 
in finance and investment while being in-
creasingly protectionist in trade. 
Where a common front is not likely to be 
formed is on issues related to capital account 
financing through borrowing in international 
capital markets. Here, a sharp division is likely 
to emerge (as it has already in Manila, Nairobi 
and at the CIEC meetings in Paris) between 
commercial and non-commercial countries. 
T h e first are deeply aware of the need to assure 
continuing availability of external finance 
(besides rapid growth in world trade), due to 
the drain of rising service payments on foreign 
exchange, so they are likely to refuse any 
"radical" proposal to default or delay or re-
schedule payments and will ask rather for new 
loans.14 In the case of most higher-income 
LDCs the problem is not the imminence of 
default or rescheduling but the distribution of 
the burden of internal adjustment. 
In my view, perhaps one of the two most 
relevant and promising areas of investigation 
in any agenda on international economic 
relations of a given country or region is the 
question of the implications of continuing 
outward-looking development strategies in 
terms of domestic income distribution and of 
the nature of the associated political regimes. 
Much more remains to be done in these areas, 
especially in terms of comparative analysis. 
There is now a growing appreciation of the 
fact that analysis should be focussed on the 
character and the social base of the State (and 
State policies) in less developed societies. 
Therefore, curious as it may seem, any agenda 
on international economic relations must in-
14As David Beim rightly asserted, the difference 
be tween rescheduling of a debt and a new loan "is nearly 
metaphysical. The economics are the same —money is 
repaid later rather than now. It is the psychology which 
differs— a rescheduling is a confrontation, an admission of 
failure, and emotional catharsis, while a new loan is 
business as usual", D.O. Beim, "Rescuing the LDCs", 
Foreign Affairs, July 1977, p . 723. 
elude an analysis of the question of the State 
in Southern and Northern countries. 
The other relevant and promising area of 
investigation has already been touched upon 
earlier: it is related to the asymmetrical out-
looks and contradictory interests within the 
less developed world. These asymmetries and 
contradictions should not be underestimated. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the "North" counts 
on them. After all, no more than 10 semi-
industrialized LDCs account for nearly 85% 
of the total (bank) external debt, and 10 semi-
industrialized countries account for nearly 80% 
of the total LDCs ' exports of manufactures. 
All the discussions and difficulties about 
intra-LDC trade as an alternative to mounting 
Northern protectionism are marred by the fact 
that in each region of the LDC world two or 
three countries are likely to be the major 
beneficiaries of regional trade agreements.15 
As pioneered by Hirschman more than thirty 
years ago, studies on the relationship between 
national power and the structure of foreign 
trade are likely to re-emerge as fascinating and 
much needed topics in the North-South 
agenda. 
Of course, any agenda of this sort must 
include a careful consideration of transnational 
corporations, especially now that it is be-
coming clear that most developing countries 
will increasingly move in the direction of 
greater vigilance over their foreign trade and 
financial links —even as they seek to expand 
those links. Harder bargaining between trans-
national corporations and the State (or State 
enterprises) in each major LDC is certain to 
occur. In my view, however, rather than 
general studies of t ransnational and their 
effects and/or general studies of possible State 
response to them, what we do need is a much 
deeper understanding of the invisible markets 
internalized in most transnational corpora-
tions, of which the visible ones are often only 
the tip of the iceberg. After all, as Diaz-Ale-
jandro noted, the conservative case for "free 
markets" has always depended upon mini-
1 5See Sir A. Lewis, "Aspects of Tropical Trade", 
Wicksell Lectures, Almqvist, Wicksell, Stockholm, 1969, 
for an elaboration oí these points. 
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mizing knowledge of how markets actually world economic order depends ultimately 
operate. Studies of the operation of imperfect upon the alleged existence of imperfect inter-
markets should be an important item in the national markets working to their disadvan-
agenda, since the LDC case for reshaping the tage. 
II 
It has become a commonplace to observe that 
Latin America was a guiding intellectual force 
for the Third World during the 1950s and 
1960s. It is true that most of the ideas about 
the unequal relationships between rich and 
poor countries emanated from the region, 
especially through the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, and it is 
well known that the creation of UNCTAD 
owes a great deal to Latin American efforts to 
show that the international economic order of 
the time was working against the Third World's 
basic interests. Today, however, Latin Ameri-
can influence has waned somewhat. After all, 
the Group of 77 of the early sixties is now made 
u p of 119 legally sovereign countries. The 
issues of the day are either global issues 
(requiring multilateral action); selective is-
sues (of non-regional character), or plain 
bilateral concerns. There is no more room for 
the exercise of leadership by one regional 
bloc: the world has become too much inte-
grated for that. There is no more room for a 
distinctive Latin American view of the so-
called North-South conflict, the controversial 
issue of the day. After all, what is Latin Ameri-
ca? 
Latin America, broady defined (i.e., in-
cluding Cuba and the Caribbean area), con-
tains twenty-five legally sovereign countries 
enjoying United Nations and World Bank 
membership . The region's total population is 
presently about 325 million, growing at an 
average of more than 2.6% a year, while its 
combined GNP for 1978 in current dollars was 
about US$ 400 billion. Obviously the old 
clichés about structural heterogeneity, asym-
metrical degrees of development and national 
potentialities apply just as much to the region 
as they do to the so-called Third World as a 
whole. Levels of per capita income range from 
US$ 200 (Haiti) to US$ 3,300 (Bahamas), al-
though the majority (15) of these 25 legally 
sovereign countries fall into the US$ 600-1,000 
range of per capita income. Above the level of 
US$ 1,140 there are only five countries: Argen-
tina, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Barba-
dos and Bahamas, while below the US$ 600 
level are El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, 
Bolivia and Haiti. According to the World 
Bank's recent classification, excluding the 
countries with population less than one million 
(Guyana, Barbados and Bahamas), centrally-
planned Cuba and extremely poor Haiti, all the 
other 20 Latin American countries fall into the 
"Middle Income Countries" category, which 
includes 58 out of the present 153 members of 
the United Nations and the World Bank.16 
T h e need for a typological classification 
of the structurally heterogeneous Latin Ameri-
can countries has been put forward forcefully, 
especially by H. Jaguaribe. His essential 
concern is with the question of "national 
viability" of the countries of the region, and he 
attempts to distinguish these countries ac-
cording to relative levels of societal develop-
ment and degrees of national viability ("rela-
tive individual viability", "collective viabili-
ty" and "non-viability"). According to his 
scheme only three countries of the region 
(namely Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) could 
pretend to reach the first type of viability; 
eight countries (all in South America) could 
hope for collective viability, and the rest fall 
into the non-viability category. Interesting as 
this may be for strategic studies of a geopoliti-
cal nature, or polemical as it may seem in terms 
of its analytical meaning, however, this is not 
exactly the sort of typology with which we 
16 For the relevant data see World Development 
Report, Washington, 1978. 
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shall concern ourselves in this paper, for 
reasons that will be clear as we proceed. 
It is perfectly true that Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina together account for 70% of Latin 
America's combined GNP and for two-thirds 
of intra-regional trade. Brazil and Mexico alone 
account for more than half of its population, 
GNP, external debt and foreign trade. It is also 
true that the combined population of 13 coun-
tries with a population of less than 5 million 
each was, in mid-1976, around 30 million 
—less than half the population of Mexico and 
less than one-third that of Brazil. It is obvious 
that countries differ not only in resources but 
also with respect to perceived needs and 
policy issues; Mexico will seek from the inter-
national financial system services rather dif-
ferent in quantity and quality from those 
sought by Ecuador. Even with respect to 
policy, Brazilian attitudes toward greater ex-
change flexibility or the extent of control over 
foreign investment can be expected to differ 
sharply from those of Guatemala. The remain-
ing paragraphs of this section represent an 
attempt to deal with these differences in re-
sources and perceptions with regard to trade, 
investment, financial flows and the future 
international monetary system. 
1. Changing trade patterns and the 
resurgence of protectionism 
The share of non-OECD countries in world 
exports declined during the 1950s and 1960s 
from 34% in 1950 to less than 20% in 1969. 
Latin America's share declined from 10% to 
5% over the same period. The proportion of 
manufactures in world trade rose from below 
40% in the thirties to 45% in 1953,54% in 1970 
and 67% in 1969:17 a phenomenon very closely 
related to international investments of the 
transnational corporations and very like 
Linder 's well-known hypothesis about the 
influence of patterns of demand and income 
levels on the shaping of trade among devel-
oping countries. For most observers, this out-
come was the natural result of the great post-
l 7 For basic data, see the relevant issues of GATT, 
International Trade. 
war liberalization project which experienced 
its golden age from 1959 (European return to 
convertibility) to 1971 (defacto collapse of the 
Bretton Woods arrangement). The "success" 
of the project was gauged by the rapid ex-
pansion of international trade (partly due to 
the progressive dismantling of the generalized 
protectionism of the inter-war period), by the 
growing internationalization of capital (partly 
mediated by the transnational corporations) 
and by the resurgence of international (private) 
financial markets which had collapsed with 
the 1929 crash and the Depression years. 
However, as noted by more than one 
observer: "at the time when the O E C D coun-
tries were rapidly dismantling their trade 
barriers against each other, they were equally 
feverishly creating new barriers to keep out 
light manufactures from the tropics ".18 Indeed, 
a recent study of the World Bank does show 
that over the last twenty-five years developing 
countries have emerged as major markets for 
the manufactured exports of the industrialized 
countries. These exports increased by 7% a 
year in the 1950s and the increase accelerated 
to 8.5% a year in real terms between 1960 and 
1975.19 Trade with developing countries ac-
counted for only 29% of the increase in the 
industrialized countries exports of manufac-
tures. Much more important, however, is the 
fact that trade with developing countries ac-
counted for only 9% of the industrialized 
countries' imports of manufactures, thereby 
confirming Sir Arthur Lewis's assertions 
above. Trade among industrialized countries 
and trade within Western Europe accounted 
for nearly 80% of the increase in the industrial-
ized countries' imports of manufactures over 
the 1960-1975 period.20 
There are no indications that these figures 
will be dramatically altered over the fore-
seeable future. On the contrary, what we have 
been observing is a sort of progressive retreat 
^A.W. Lewis, "Aspects of Tropical Trade: 1883-
1965", Wicksell Lectures, op. cit., p. 40. 
'The developing countries' exports have increased 
more slowly than those oí'the industrialized countries over 
the last twenty years (5.9% per year as against 7.5% per 
year on average). 
2()World Development Report, 1978, op. cit., p. 9. 
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by the North from liberal trade in the face of 
the increased competition of imports from 
newly industrializing countries. It should be 
noted, moreover, that manufactured exports 
are highly concentrated in the developing 
world. About 45% of them come from four 
countries: Korea, Taiwan, Spain and Hong 
Kong, and as the World Bank notes, the ad-
dition to this list of Yugoslavia, Brazil, India, 
Mexico, Israel, Portugal, Singapore and Greece 
raises the proportion to around 80%, although 
it is true that exports of manufactures from 
countries such as Malaysia, Colombia, Turkey 
and Thailand have increased substantially. 
But what are the prospects for the 1980s and 
what is the role of the Latin American coun-
tries? After all, as noted by Lewis, in each 
region of the globe we observe today the 
existence of two or three semi-industrialized 
countries which tend to be the natural bene-
ficiaries of a possible "new order" which 
assures LDCs access to new markets, intra-
regional or not. As Diaz-Alejandro put it: 
"several of the LDCs which have spearheaded 
the drive for a NIEO, and the public and 
private agents behind that drive, may best be 
conceptualized as new oligopolists trying to 
break into world markets dominated by old 
oligopolists. The new oligopolists want to 
exercise a greater share of market power... and 
to participate in 'organizing' trade in (these) 
world markets".21 
In a recent paper, Chenery and Keesing22 
have attempted to clarify the comparative 
advantage of country groups by classifying 
LDC trade and production patterns into four 
groups: (a) countries that specialized relatively 
early in exports of manufactures and have 
followed generally outward-looking policies; 
(b) large semi-industrial countries with rela-
tively low export/GNP ratios that have 
achieved success in industrialization based 
on the domestic market and have also moved 
21C. Diaz-Alejandro, "International Markets for LDCs 
- The Old and the New", American Economic Review, 
Nashville, Tenn., Vol. 68, No. 2, May 1978, p. 268. 
^H.B. Chenery and D.B. Keesing, "The Changing 
Composition of Developing Country Exports", Back-
ground Paper No. 5 to World Development Report 1978, 
September 1978, op. cit., pp. 21-23. 
to promote exports of manufactures; (c) coun-
tries now emerging from primary specializa-
tion which are changing their policies in an 
attempt to diversify their exports and ac-
celerate development; (d) large poor countries 
with significant exports of manufactures. What 
is the significance of such a classification for 
the Latin American countries? 
The first group contains only East Asian 
(Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Korea) and 
Mediterranean countries, all characterized by 
limited natural resources. Their exports have 
usually (or initially) been labour-intensive and 
technologically stable products such as tex-
tiles, clothing, footwear, assembled electronic 
components, toys, etc. However, as Chenery 
and Keesing noted "... over 90% of LDC 
clothing exports and almost all the electronic 
products come from locations where imported 
inputs are given virtual free-trade treatment 
by one means or another".23 Obviously, this 
is not a path open today to semi-industrialized 
countries which have experienced a long 
period of import substitution. But more impor-
tantly, as Arthur Lewis reminded us a decade 
ago: "... the real problems of continued success 
are more probably related to the structure of 
export organizations and to the financing of 
foreign trade. Food and raw materials are sold 
on international commodity exchanges but 
manufactures have to be sold by sellers and 
buyers seeking each other out ... price and 
quality are not all that is required for suc-
cess ,..".24 Chenery and Keesing seem to 
confirm that assertion: "LDCs limited capa-
bilities in marketing and related aspects of 
design appear to restrict capacity to export 
even labour-intensive goods".25 The Latin 
American countries' potential seems to depend 
crucially upon the transnational corporations' 
interest in exporting manufactures from the 
host countries, a point we will tackle in the 
next section. 
The second group in the Chenery-Keesing 
classification (large semi-industrialized coun-
tries) is well-known in Latin America, where 
23Chenery and Keesing, op, cit-, p. 24. 
^A. W. Lewis, op. cit., p. 44. 
^Chenery and Keesing, op. cit., p. 26. 
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market size has allowed Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico, for instance, to build up (behind 
protective barriers) a substantial industrial 
structure which allowed, later on, some degree 
oí success in their development of some ex-
ports based on economies of scales. In Latin 
America the three largest countries account 
for around 70% of intra-regional trade and 
(excluding oil-rich Venezuela) for around 60% 
of the region's total exports. However, success 
depends to an even greater degree than in 
consumer goods on design and the organization 
of marketing and technical services, which 
again pushes to the forefront of the discussion 
the role of the transnational corporations in 
Latin America. 
The third group is made up of countries 
emerging from primary specialization. Their 
apparent success is basically due to the ex-
tremely favourable international conditions 
prevailing in the sixties, especially from 1967 
to 1973, when world trade grew at nearly 19% 
a year in current dollar terms. Their prospects 
are not so bright under the conditions likely to 
prevail in the 1980s, however, as we shall see 
shortly. In Latin America, Colombia's expan-
sion of exports of manufactures and Chile's 
recent attempts to liberalize its economy are 
the only examples of this category of "emer-
gence from primary specialization" towards 
diversification (in the case of Chile diversifi-
cation of both exports and imports). The fourth 
group (large poor countries) is not relevant to 
Latin America, since it is made up of countries 
such as India and Pakistan and the only pos-
sible Latin American examples (Brazil and 
Mexico) are not that poor. Interesting as it may 
seem, however, this classification does not go 
to the crucial issue at stake: the prospects for 
outward-looking strategies under present 
world conditions, and the prospects for the 
future. Part of the discussion in this connexion 
will take place in the section dealing with the 
present "non-system" and the future interna-
tional monetary system. For the purposes of the 
present section, it is sufficient to note a crucial 
structural factor associated with the interna-
tionalization of capital and the international 
diffusion of technical knowledge. Both, as 
noted by R. Cooper "... reduce the costs, in 
terms of output foregone, of shifting resources 
from the production of one good to another 
—that is, these changes make the conventional 
production possibilities frontier flatter ... 
[although] ... it is true that this means that 
trade becomes less profitable in the sense that 
the difference between the cost of producing 
for export and the cost of producing the import-
competing goods at home has dimished".26 It 
is obvious that the volume of trade (relative to 
income) need not fall if, for instance, innova-
tions are more frequent in the export industries 
and/or demand patterns converge interna-
tionally more rapidly than the structures of 
production costs —both trends which have 
been observed up to the present. There are no 
signs, however, that these past events are 
likely to be repeated in the future. The rate 
of growth of world trade, for example, is not 
likely to remain at more than 7% a year as in 
the past twenty-five years. 
This last observation —if correct— affects 
the Latin American countries in a rather special 
way. After all, the share of intra-regional ex-
ports in total Latin American exports is around 
16%. More than 70% of the region's exports 
are directed towards the "Northern" devel-
oped countries. Outward-looking policies 
depend essentially upon the state of expecta-
tions regarding world trade prospects. The 
resurgence of protectionism and the revised 
(downward) estimates of real income growth in 
the North do represent a serious cause of 
concern. The present mood, in Latin America 
at least, is well summarized in the following 
statement by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro: "... inter-
national links may be useful to help countries 
achieve some development targets under some 
conditions and specific historical circum-
stances, but it is fatal to regard openness as a 
good thing per se and to let external links and 
foreign demand become the engine of 
growth".27 With the possible exception of Chile 
and of those small countries which really do not 
have much choice, most Latin American coun-
2(lR. N. Cooper "Growth and Trade; Some Hypotheses 
about Long-Term Trends", The Journal of Economic 
History, Wilmington, Del., December 1964, pp. 625-626. 
27C. Diaz-Alejandro, Delinking North and South: 
Unshackled or Unhinged?, preliminary draft, 1977. 
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tries will follow —or have been following— 
this advice in practice, if not in rhetorical terms. 
Trade, per se, is not seen any more as a deus ex 
machina, as it used to be in the euphoric late 
sixties-early seventies, although Latin America 
can be expected to form a common front against 
the Northern countries' limitation of access to 
their markets and reluctance to restructure 
their economies by phasing out industries 
which are not internationally competitive any 
more. But it is not only the Latin American 
countries which call for these reforms, and 
even within Latin America the issue is much 
more pressing for some countries than for 
others. Those for which it is most pressing 
could more easily find allies outside the region. 
2. The question of foreign investment 
and technology 
The way in which the process of interna-
tionalization of capital may conceivably pro-
ceed in the future is a crucial element behind 
any discussion of" the so-called New Inter-
national Economic Order, The preceding 
paragraphs dealt with the implications for 
trade of the changing international division 
of labour associated with the world-wide 
diffusion of capital and technology. In this 
section, we would like to address ourselves to 
the question of foreign investment proper in 
the framework of the North-South conflict. 
Perhaps more than any other this is an area 
which economics and politics are closely 
inter twined and old slogans about imperialism 
and manichaeistic attitudes towards trans-
national corporations still exert a great deal of 
influence. 
The perceptions dominant in the North 
usually emphasize what is perceived as a sort 
of schizophrenic attitude of Southern coun-
tries with regard to foreign direct investment. 
On the one hand, the South seems to need, 
demand, and often compete for more foreign 
investment, perhaps influenced by the so-
called success stories of capital accumulation 
cum industrial diversification observed after 
the war (but especially in the sixties) in coun-
tries such as Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong and other "newly indus-
trializing countries", all of which relied upon 
a significant contribution of foreign capital. On 
the other hand, the North sees the South (or 
the major part of it) as refusing to abide by 
internationally defined rules and procedures 
(especially with respect to expropriation) and 
neglecting the creation of a proper "invest-
ment climate" through the reduction of politi-
cal risks as perceived by would-be private 
investors. 
The magnitude of the resources under-
lying this discussion are rather significant: 
taking the United States alone, the direct 
investment position at the end of 1977 (net 
book value) was US$ 149 billion, but only 
US$ 34 billion of this was located in the devel-
oping countries, 80% of it in Latin America 
(nearly US$ 28 billion).28 The importance of 
Latin America has been declining, however. 
Over the 1975-1977 period, the flow of United 
States capital directed to the developing coun-
tries remained around 20-25% of the total (the 
same proportion as in the case of the existing 
investments), but less than half of this was 
directed towards Latin America.20 It is impor-
tant to note that United States foreign direct 
investment, both in terms of existing invest-
ments and new flows, is highly concentrated 
in the developed world (US$ 108 out of 
US$ 149 billion). Foreign direct investment in 
the United States at the end of 1977 was 
estimated at US$ 34 billion, with eight devel-
oped countries accounting for more than 85% of 
the total.30 Thus, foreign direct investment 
is also an "intra-North" affair, but apparently 
not a cause of concern for the countries in-
volved. Why, then, is the issue so hotly debated 
within the South and in North-South relations? 
In point of fact, this "paradox" puzzles 
only the more naive observers,31 for whom 
2 8 United States Department of Commerce, Stiruey of 
Current Business, August 1978, pp. 16-17. 
2 9Capital expenditure by majority-owned foreign 
affiliates of United States companies in 1975, 1976 and 
1977 was respectively 26.8, 26.0 and 29.1 billion dollars, 
of whicb the developing countries received respectively 
6.4, 5.4 and 6.Ü billion. Latin America received 3.1, 2.9 
and 2.9, respectively. See Survey of Current Business, 
op. cit., September 1977, pp. 26-28. 
mSurvey of Current Business, August 1978, op. cit., 
p. 39. 
3 1 See, for example, P. Juhl, "Prospects for Foreign 
Direct Investment in Developing Countries" in H. Giersch 
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increasing the mobility of capital through 
worldwide expansion of private investment 
would not only allow for a more efficient 
allocation of resources at the international level 
but might even shift outward a hypothetical 
Southern production possibility frontier, 
thereby increasing the South's total well-being 
(if measured, as usual, by the current flow of 
goods and services). In addition, the argument 
goes, by helping to relieve the foreign ex-
change constraint faced by most Southern 
countries, foreign investment could play a 
crucial role in reducing the depressing and 
widening gap between (most of) the poor 
countries and the rich nations. 
Underlying this view is the strong pre-
sumption that the private (internationally-
minded) sector of the developed world is 
always bullish, opportunity-perceiving, ready 
to assume risks in far-away exotic countries, 
guided by marked signals and profit expecta-
tions (obviously affected by guarantees and 
incentives given by the potential hosts). Howe-
ver, as Professor Vernon warned us: "The 
evidence is persuasive that the investment 
process is a relatively rational phenomenon 
—rational in the sense that it is consistent 
with an effort to maximize profit and mini-
mize risk. The environment in which these 
activities take place, however, is one in which 
oligopoly is the normal state, scale factors are 
very large, and uncertainties of various sorts 
dominate the calculation".32 
Indeed, since the work of Penrose, Hymer, 
Rowthorn, Vernon, Knickerbocker, Caves and 
others, the understanding of these flows is 
based mainly on the theory of the growth of the 
(big) firm, and especially on the reaction of 
firms in oligopolistic market structures to the 
actual or perceived threat to their respective 
market shares. In other words, when we talk 
about foreign direct investment today, we do 
not mean decisions to locate small repair shops 
or grocery stores in Karachi or Tegucigalpa, 
(éd.), Reshaping the World Economic Order, Tubingen, 
J.C.B. Mahor {Paul Siebeck), 1977. 
3 2 Raymond Vernon, "A Program ot Research on 
Foreign Direct Investment", in C. Bergsten (éd.), The 
Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda 
for Research, Lexington, Mass., 1973, p . 96. 
but huge sums of indivisible expenditures 
aimed at gaining or retaining control of specific 
resources and/or promising markets. To quote 
Vernon again: "Foreign investments in oli-
gopolistic industries are often made in order to 
counter a threat to the stability of the oligopoly 
structure itself, that is, in order to protect and 
prolong an existing oligopoly rent''.33 
This last (crucial) observation means that, 
in practice, foreign direct investment affects 
developing countries in a rather asymmetrical 
way. For a poor "Southern" —or Latin Ame-
rican— country for instance, agreeing to relin-
quish some national autonomy with respect to 
the definition of the pattern of foreign invest-
ment is no guarantee whatsoever that foreign 
investment will flow to the country in the 
magnitude and type desired. The so-called 
market economy simply does not function that 
way. The flow of foreign investment will 
probably be directed to relatively richer or 
resource-rich Southern countries, as it has been 
doing for decades, irrespective of multinational 
agreements designed to insure foreign inves-
tors against political risks. 
Latin American countries display a long 
tradition of political and economic concern 
with foreign investment (especially United 
States direct investment). There are sound 
historical reasons for this, but perhaps they are 
no more profound than the historical reasons of 
countries which have been made legally 
sovereign over the last two decades or so. Even 
within Latin America, however, agreement on 
subregional common attitudes towards foreign 
investment is hard to come by, as witness the 
Chilean opposition to the Andean Group's 
proposed policies and controls over foreign 
investment and the transfer of technology. 
Negotiations over a code to cover this transfer 
from rich countries (i.e., companies) to poor 
countries have been progressing: of the 160 or 
so points in the code nearly 120 have been 
agreed upon so far. What is left is of course the 
hardest part. But countries such as Brazil have 
been deriving benefits from multilateral 
negotiations coupled with pragmatic bilateral 
and/or specific negotiations for such transfer. 
Mlbid., p. 100. 
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Obviously, the bargaining power of Brazil (due 
to its market size) is much bigger than that of 
the smaller countries in the region, and a 
common regional attitude towards foreign 
investment and technology would be hard to 
achieve, but one could well predict that the 
general trend will be towards an increase in 
selective controls over the pattern of foreign 
investment even when the desire is to increase 
its global volume. 
One direction in which one could well 
expect progressive intervention (or stimuli) is 
in the promotion of exports by transnational 
corporations. After all, ongoing research in 
Latin America is confirming the relationship 
be tween foreign capital, external indebtedness 
and high propensities to import which are not 
matched by a comparable flow of industrial 
exports. It should be noted that for Latin 
America foreign capital investment (United 
States origin) in manufacturing represents 
37% of the total while for the developed 
countries the proportion of United States 
capital in manufacturing is nearly 50%. In Latin 
America, however, the rate of return on activi-
ties other than manufacturing has been around 
50% higher than the rate of return in manu-
facturing over the last few years, while in 
developed countries the rates of return are 
nearly equal.34 Therefore, the countries which 
can potentially attract foreign direct invest-
ment through fiscal incentives, subsidies and 
guarantees may well wonder if they are not a bit 
ill-advised to attempt to reproduce (especially 
after the oil crisis) the pattern of (private) 
consumption-biased capital accumulation to 
which foreign direct investment seems to be 
most suited. Latin America should serve —to 
other "Southern" countries— as a fascinating 
set of case studies on the benefits and costs of 
foreign investment and technological depen-
dence. 
3. Financial flows, external debt and the 
future international monetary system 
As is becoming increasingly well-known by 
now, the world crisis of the early 1970s was not 
•^Survey of Current Business, August 1978, op. cit., 
pp. 16-22. 
due simply to the quadrupling of oil prices 
decided by OPEC late in 1973. The crisis was a 
"systemic" crisis with both real and financial 
underlying factors, the oil price rise being 
merely the most apparent and dramatic 
consequence —as well as a contributing fac-
tor.35 This is not the place to survey this 
fascinating course of events. It suffices to note 
that three classes of problems have dominated 
the discussion in the aftermath of OPEC's 
decision; (a) the costs and consequences of the 
adjustment to the abrupt change in relative 
prices and to the tax levied by OPEC on oil-
importing countries, which led to the uncom-
fortable combination of inflation and recession; 
(b) the sudden discovery of the vulnerability of 
even major capitalist countries to sudden in-
terruptions in oil supply —and the ensuing 
controversy about alternative sources of energy 
for the long term; (c) the difficulties involved 
in the recycling of the surpluses rapidly 
accumulating in the external accounts of oil-
exporting countries. 
The first two problems are still very much 
with us and likely to remain so for many years 
to come. With respect to the last problem, we 
now know that the initial worries have proved 
exaggerated as regards its two significant 
dimensions: the projections of future OPEC 
surpluses and the alleged inability of the 
private financial system to recycle them with 
the appropriate speed. In retrospect, the 
accumulated actual surplus of OPEC over the 
five years from 1974 to 1978 was around 
US$ 180 billion in current dollars, or only about 
half the initial estimates of both OECD and the 
World Bank. Its decline in real terms has been 
extremely marked, since the increase in 
wholesale prices in the United States, for 
example, was around 50% over the last five 
years. On the other hand, the recycling was 
effected by the private financial system in a 
way that surprised most observers —although 
at a cost that one would have to analyse in terms 
35See Professor Triffin's writings since the late fifties 
about the inherent contradictions of the Bretton Woods 
system, the collapse of which he predicted ten years before 
it happened. For the underlying real factors see N. Kaldor, 
"Inflation and Recession in the World Economy", Eco-
nomic Journal, New York, December 1976. 
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of its implications for the future. Indeed, oil-
importing developing countries had to face 
both higher oil prices (among other higher 
import prices) and the effects on their export 
receipts of the simultaneous (1974-1975) 
recession in the North. 
Growing foreign indebtedness was the 
inevitable result. As noted by Fishlow, "LDC 
debt after 1974 was therefore a necessary 
concomitant to sustain global economic ac-
tivity. In the absence of willing debtors and 
with all countries striving for exports to pay for 
oil, the consequences easily would have 
rivaled those of the Great Depression".36 In 
point of fact, the external debt of oil-importing 
LDCs, which had augmented from less than 
US$ 40 billion in 1967 to nearly US$ 100 billion 
in 1973, reached some US$ 280-290 billion by 
1978. It is obvious that a growing foreign debt 
of this magnitude poses a serious problem to 
the world economy (since it is ultimately a 
global trade problem) and not only to specific 
borrowers. It should be noted, moreover, that 
the recycling as realized by the private banking 
system dramatically accentuated the asymme-
tries within the South. Some ten or twelve of 
the most "comercial" countries are responsible 
today for nearly 85% of total LDC external debt 
to the international banking system. Brazil and 
Mexico alone are reported to account for nearly 
50% of the total. Peru has faced the political 
consequences of having foreign debt run out ol 
control, as did Zaire. The constraints of foreign 
debt servicing —and the burden of internal 
adjustment— are a serious concern in many 
Southern countries. 
Globally speaking, some optimistic ob-
servers have concluded that the adjustment to 
the "oil crisis" is over, in the sense that the 
O P E C surplus is not a worry anymore (German 
and Japanese surpluses were indeed higher 
than OPEC's in 1978), and that the recycling 
was done with the proper speed. We hope to 
show, however, that there are no grounds for 
such optimism. To begin with, the present 
international monetary system is still what J. 
Williamson called a "non-system" in which the 
traditional problems oí confidence (in a stable 
36A. Fishlow, "Debt Remains a Problem", Foreign 
Policy, Spring 1977, p. 136. 
reserve currency), of adjustment to asymmet-
tries in balance-of-payments positions among 
major trading countries, and of control of the 
expansion of international liquidity remain 
unsolved. With respect to the first problem, 
there is no longer a single risk-free asset in the 
system. The dollar played this role in the past, 
but a fluctuating dollar cannot serve any more 
as a satisfactory international monetary stan-
dard. Fluctuations really have been too big: a 
12% swing (such as the one experienced by the 
dollar in 1978) vis-à-vis the average of other 
rates seems unduly high. These swings have a 
peculiar effect on prices: they push prices up 
in depreciating countries but they do not pull 
prices down in the appreciating countries, so 
they exercise a net inflationary effect which in 
due course may affect the terms of trade against 
developing countries. 
The adjustment problem is yet to be 
solved too. Textbook writers would say that 
floating rates are designed to deal with it. What 
we have, however, is not a textbook case of 
perfect floating rates, but a system of managed 
or dirty floating which has the effect of trans-
mitting inflation internationally and might 
transmit recession internationally if the 
Northern countries give top priority to their 
domestic problems and decide not to gear their 
monetary policies to the aim of stabilizing 
exchange rates. The international transmission 
mechanisms of both inflation and recession 
under dirty floating are phenomena in search 
of a theory, but they should be a cause of 
concern, for the rate of growth of world trade 
could very well be reduced by too much 
variability in exchange rates due to large 
potential movements of short-term capital of 
the size and mobility which characterize the 
present situation. This brings us to the control 
of international liquidity, still to be accom-
plished at the world level. Indeed, probably 
the villain of the piece —in its monetary 
version— is the volume of perfectly mobile 
liquid funds available at short notice in the so-
called Eurocurrency market, estimated at more 
than US$ 450 billion. These funds allowed 
some free rides after 1974 and are behind the 
excessive foreign capital inflows experienced 
by a number of Southern countries, many of 
them in Latin America. 
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Latin America has in a sense a common 
stake —and in our view a role to play— in the 
discussion about the (yet to be designed) 
international monetary system, not only with 
respect to the confidence problem but espe-
cially with respect to the adjustment problem 
(through exchange rates) and to the control of 
the system of international credit creation, For 
several Latin American countries diversifica-
tion of trade has advanced sufficiently far to 
render untenable the view that for all practical 
purposes the optimum currency area for a 
developing country is that between it and its 
dominant trading partner. While in the late 
forties and early fifties around one-half of total 
Latin American exports went to the United 
States, by the late seventies this proportion had 
declined to around 30%. Fluctuations among 
key currencies introduce a serious source of 
uncertainty about the terms of trade, the cost 
of servicing the foreign debt, the composition 
of reserves and the balance of payments proper. 
Latin America as a region —and each country 
within the region— does have (or should have) 
an interest in multilateral co-ordination at the 
world level, and as we all know, in order to 
have an effective voice in such negotiations the 
smaller and peripheral countries will have to 
group together in order to defend their com-
mon interests jointly. 
This joint defence of common interests 
might* be easier to advocate than to realize, 
however. The world encompasses today more 
than 150 legally sovereign countries, ines-
capably interdependent, but in a rather special 
way. Indeed, as Triffin noted recently, "a 
minimum of realism will force each country to 
focus its negotiating capabilities on co-ordi-
nating its intervention policies with those of 
the handful of partner countries most important 
in their foreign transactions and most ready to 
accept and implement co-ordination commit-
ments".37 The emerging European Monetary 
System is a case in point —and one to which 
Latin America should have been paying much 
more attention. Thus, while Latin American 
countries absorb only 16% of Latin America's 
total exports, European Community countries 
absorb more than half of the participating 
countries' merchandise exports. Obviously, 
this proportion is much higher still for other 
transactions and therefore for their current 
account receipts and expenditures in general. 
Moreover, as Triffin notes, the exchange rates 
of many other European, Middle East and 
African countries are likely to gravitate also 
around the proposed European Currency Unit. 
Triffin estimates that the "emerging European 
exchange area will probably account for 2/3 to 
3/4 of the member countries' external transac-
tions".38 
These events will certainly have an impact 
on Latin America, which, although as a region it 
does not gravitate so much around the dollar as 
it did in the past and will never gravitate 
around the European currency area, has not 
had a very successful experience of integration 
and is too heterogeneous to have a common 
regional stance in world negotiations. On 
matters of substance, Venezuela will more 
likely close ranks with OPEC than with its 
neighbours; Brazil with the more advanced 
semi-industrial new oligopolists than with the 
poorer countries of the region, and so forth. 
One real common front is the desire to obtain a 
net flow of real resources from the "North", 
financed preferably by a rise in Latin American 
export prices rather than through (capital 
account) borrowing. The critical attitude to 
Northern protectionism could also be con-
sidered another common front. Neither are 
specifically Latin American, however. Latin 
American countries must rally specific support 
outside the region for specific concerns. A 
possible New International Economic Order 
will not depend in any meaningful sense upon 
Latin American regional interests or Latin 
American leadership as a region with coherent 
common interests. This is not to say that the 
countries of the region do not have a role to play 
in international forums. However, much 
depends on their ability to see —and act— 
beyond the region, for today's apparently 
specific issues are really global issues of an 
7R. Triffin, "The Emerging European Monetary 
System", mimeo, March 1979, p. 3. M R Trifïïn, ibid., p. 5. 
80 CEPAL REVIEW No. 10 / April 1980 
inescapably interdependent world into which 
even centrally planned economies are in-
creasingly integrated. Paradoxically enough, 
the Latin American countries' influence in the 
framing of an eventual New International 
Economic Order will be greater, the sooner 
those countries recognize the global nature of 
their concerns —and act accordingly. 
